Abstract
This paper examines how „disinformation” has shifted from a term for deliberate deception, often tied to propaganda, into a broader political label used to dismiss disputed or inconvenient claims. It argues that this expansion turns disinformation into a „devil term,” weakening its meaning and threatening free speech. Through examples from elections, media, COVID-19, and public debate, the paper distinguishes falsehood from definitional disagreement and warns against centralized truth policing. It concludes that open dialogue, careful definitions, and public contestation of ideas offer a better response than censorship.
American Humorist Mark Twain is credited with popularizing the notion that there are three kinds of lies: „Lies, damned lies, and statistics.”[1] Though his main point was about the ability of statistics to strengthen weak arguments, he also hits upon a secondary point that not all lies are equal in degree. It is in this light that this paper examines the term „disinformation” as it is used in the political realm, and how it interacts with the notion of free speech.
Disinformation
According to Google trends, the term „disinformation” has experienced a significant uptrend of usage since 2016. Though this observation is not scientific in any sense of the word, it is a useful tool that serves as a sort of snapshot of trending search term and how they compare over time.
Certainly, the term has existed long beforehand. Nexis Uni shows usage of the term over the last 50 years in sporadic fashion. Yet, prior to 2016, most of the application was limited to either accusations of Russian KGB operations, or in context of the United States 1966 Freedom of Information Act, which sought to diminish the use of disinformation as it pertained to federal bureaus misleading US citizens.
Since then, however, and starting in the lead up to the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, I argue that „disinformation” has taken on another life and has morphed from a specific accusation against certain entities (foreign or domestic) into a sort of catchall term for any news or any information that could be deemed erroneous or problematic to the person using it.
The question at hand is how political observers and participants can navigate the complexity of the term, in what has been called a „post-truth” world, while upholding the ideas of free speech. In this paper, I briefly outline the nature of the term, the changing usage of the term in what has been called „the Trump era”, the application of this changing terminology, and offer a way of overcoming the terministic limitations of „disinformation” in an era where free speech still matters.
At first glance, „disinformation” may be seen as belonging to the same category as „lie”. Closely related is the Trump-era term „fake news”. The main idea being that whatever is said is not only wrong, but intentionally so, created and distributed for the purpose of misleading. This is the sense in which the older versions of the term operated. As one example, 1975’s U.S. News and World Report wrote on the continued use of Russian „disinformation” – that is, lying rumors’ intended to discredit deported Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn’. In short, Russia did like the idea of a free-thinking expatriate spreading stories about the mother land, so they launched a disinformation campaign to malign his character.[2] Similarly, a 1980 Associated Press article explained that a „Carter administration official has accused Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of spreading „disinformation” about the Soviet intervention [sic] into Afghanistan.”[3] Here too, „misinformation” serves as a descriptive term for the news from Russia, intended to mislead or dismiss the happenings as something they are not. Such is the general sense of the term in this era.
Here we should develop and differentiate a second definition of „disinformation.” In this sense, „disinformation” is not of the same caliber as „lie” but rather falls into a newer category of what I’ve termed „definitional disagreement.” In this case, the issue at hand is not whether the thing itself happened, but rather the extent to which the thing occurred, or the extent to which the thing mattered. As one example of this usage, consider the oft repeated accusation that Trump’s 2020 presidential loss was due to fraud or that „the vote was stolen.” This accusation was litigated in numerous courts, and none of them found rationale to overturn any of the individual states’ election counts. In that regard, the assertion of „fraud” or „stolen” certainly qualifies as disinformation.
However, there have been numerous convictions for individuals who did in fact commit fraud in the 2020 general election. For example, „Melissa Ann Fisher, 53, was sentenced to three to 23 months in Bucks County Correctional Facility, as well as three years of probation, for mail-in ballot fraud (Dornblaser).” Elsewhere, Michael J. Waterman was found guilty of voting twice, also in the 2020 general election, in Wisconsin, a state that went to Joe Biden by only about 20,000 votes.[4] Conservative political organizations such as the Heritage Foundation keep an archive of these and many of the other voter fraud convictions which occurred after the 2020 election.[5]
So we find a work the idea of definitional disagreement. On the one hand, the election wasn’t stolen. On the other, there has been significant proven instances of fraud, and it’s reasonable to assume that other instances have gone undetected. Anecdotally, as I was explaining this paper to a colleague, and talking about these voter fraud convictions, his response was „Fine, there was fraud, but it wasn’t enough to matter.” And this is the perfect example of how these terms play out in the public psyche. For, again, there is really no disagreement as to the existence of fraud. But rather the disagreement lies in the extent of fraud that would constitute „a stolen election”. And here, there is no agreement. Such ambiguous definition of terms like „fraud” and „stolen” have the effect of allowing both sides of the disagreement to point to their chosen sources and claim rightness. Thus, prompting one bit of proof over another allows accusations of „disinformation” to thrive.
The problem, from a political application, is that the existence of these and other terms such as „lie” has served the purpose of making „disinformation” into what Richard Weaver has called a „devil term”. „Devil term” can best be understood by examining their counterpart, what Weaver calls „god terms” or „an expression about which all other expressions are ranked subordinate and serving dominions and powers.” Further, „if one can make it stick, it will validate almost anything (Weaver 212).”
Conversely, „devil” terms serve the exact opposite function. Labeling anything with one of these terms means immediate and visceral repulsion is expected, so much so that „they defy any real analysis. That is to say that one cannot explain how they generate their peculiar force of repudiation. One only recognizes them as publicly-agreed-upon devil terms (Weaver 223).”
It seems that „disinformation” has become somewhat of a „devil term” in contemporary political discourse. Its use, and even overuse, stems not from the inherent power of the term, but from the power that the term has gained as it helps political actors effectively silence critics. The main thrust of my argument is that by attaching the term „disinformation” to events which do not really meet the technical requirement of the label, we’ve created a situation wherein notions that are not wrong, but rather politically inconvenient can be quickly dismissed as „disinformation”, even if this broader application is accurate.
This creates a vicious cycle wherein the term eventually loses all meaning, and true disinformation” can then thrive without legitimate challenge.
The early 21st century saw this new form of „disinformation” come into play, primarily with the 2016 election. For context, in the lead up to the 2016 U.S. election, most polls predicted Hillary Clinton winning by a 3-7-point margin. The RealClearPolitics poll aggregation saw Clinton with a 3.2% lead.[6] As late as two weeks before the election, the New York Times headline read „Hillary Clinton has a 91% chance to win.”[7] MSNBC went even further, promoting a story that „Scientist predicts 99% change of Clinton winning.”[8] Election day saw the polls being almost right on, with Clinton winning the popular vote by 2%. Yet, due to the unique nature of the American Electoral College, Trump won the election, 306-232. Pollsters were in shock. There had to be an explanation for such a major upset. As indicated by Google Trends, „disinformation” seemed to be the reasoning that could best decipher this mystery. And it is here that we see a shift in the definition of „disinformation” from the kind that had traditionally been used to label the actions of Russian propaganda machine, to becoming somewhat of an umbrella term that can be used to understand political events that cannot otherwise be explained.
The primary issue of dismissing news as „fake” or as „disinformation” is that often, what is being dismissed is not a matter of accurate or not, but rather an issue of definition.
Take for instance the oft shared and largely dismissed article that appeared on the now defunct WTOE5 news site. The headline of the article stated that „Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President.” This was identified by major fact checking organizations such as Snopes[9] and Factcheck.org[10] as false or, at best, satire. Yet, in October 2016, the pope did advise U.S. Catholics to pray about the election and „choose in conscience.”[11] I would argue that though this is by no means an explicit endorsement, it doesn’t take a huge leap of logic to infer that, given the Catholic church’s stance on issues like abortion, contraception, and the like, this could be interpreted as a weak, backhanded endorsement of a sort. And, if this is granted as such, then the label of „disinformation” is not wholly accurate: for even a grain of truth can make total dismissal inaccurate.
In another instance, Trump was labeled by FactCheck.org as having taken out of context comments by former President Bill Clinton about the cost increases of the Affordable Care Act.[12] „Bill Clinton called it CRAZY” blared Trump on Twitter.[13] And yet, as with many things such as this, the statement that Trump identified in Clinton’s words was not totally inaccurate. At the speech, Clinton did in fact refer to the heightened costs as „craziest thing in the world.”[14] This indictment of what was then seen as a hallmark of Obama’s presidency was strong enough that it forced Bill Clinton to „clarify” his words the next day, offering an alternative interpretation or his words.
So, the legitimate question becomes, does Clinton’s „clarification” the day after undo or contextualize what are apparently his unvarnished thoughts about the ACA? If not, then what PolitiFact labeled as disinformation was not really so but was in fact simply Trump identifying and exploiting an opportunity afforded to him by his opponent’s political surrogate. Far from being „disinformation” of the traditional kind, this could as easily be labeled as shrewd political maneuvering. And yet, from the stance of PolitiFact, this whole issue is yet another example of „disinformation.” Nothing to see here. Move along.
In multiple instances, we see this kind of this occurring: statements or ideas that do have a plausible element are dismissed outright, as pure disinformation. Terms like „out of context” or „fake news” are used to discredit many of Trump’s statements.
None of this is to say that the old application of truly false news has fallen away. To be certain, disinformation of this kind is still a real phenomenon. There is no shortage of news that is presented as fact when in truth, it is taken out of context or edited in such a way as to say something it really does not. January 16, 2024, found a clip uploaded to TikTok of documentary film maker Michael Moore seemingly endorsing Donald Trump. The larger context is just the opposite. But the edit does indeed seem to offer praise for Trump and for those who support him.[15] It’s this kind of example that fits Adam Chiara’s definition: „malicious stories created with no intent for the search of truth.”[16] This is classic misinformation: „news” intended to deceive, with no presumption of truth.
But what seems to be happening in the political conversation is that the existence of this kind of outright deceitful storytelling is empowering the term „disinformation” with sufficient negative association that one can now simply label nearly anything that is not perfectly aligned with truth, as „disinformation”. And with this broad application, the resultant terminology loses a good amount of its power. The terms ends up dwelling in the realm of self-defeatism. As the antagonist in the 2004 Disney movie The Incredibles once stated, „If everyone is super, then no one is super”. So too might we draw application to the terms of „disinformation”. If everything is disinformation, then nothing is disinformation.
The idea of „Dialectic terms” applies here. In short, comprehending some concepts requires comparing them to their opposites. Further, depending on what we contrast certain terms against, the definition of the thing itself changes. So, „disinformation” needs an opposite. And because we’re dealing with ambiguous, imprecise words such as „truth” and „accuracy,” it’s unlikely that any two people will ever fully agree on what is „truth”, yet alone people from opposing political ideologizers. How much misspeaking is allowed before the statement becomes a lie? What percentage deviation from accurate statistics is tolerable before the statement becomes misleading? There is no agreement on these allowances. Further, we seem willing to forgive our people more than those from the „other side” and vice versa. Consequently, everyone is „lying,” nothing is true, and therefore everything is disinformation. And then everything is disinformation, nothing is disinformation. The term loses all force of legitimacy.
And here is the crux of this argument; namely that disinformation has, in recent years, turned from something of a substantive claim about outright false statements, into something that is used by media, governments, political parties, or even individuals to simply dismiss inconvenient ideas. This sort of thinking is made apparent at events such as the 2024 World Economic Forum in Davos Switzerland where, in the 2024 Global Risks Report, the organization identified „Misinformation and Disinformation” as the most pressing short-term global risk, of greater concern that Extreme weather events, Cyber insecurity, Inflation, or Pollution. A skeptical read of this thinking can be supported by examining some of the statements of the forum leadership. Ursula Von Der Leyen noted that due to the pressing need to address disinformation „this is a time to drive global collaboration more than ever before. This requires immediate and structural responses to match the size of the global challenges”.[17]
In a forum titled „Defending Truth,” participants lamented that the legacy media is no longer. Emma Tucker, Editor-in-Chief at the Wall Street Journal. „Not long ago, we kind of, we owned the news. We were the gatekeepers and we very much owned the facts as well. Nowadays, people can go to all sorts of different sources for the news, and they are much more questioning about what we are saying… We need to be much more transparent about how we go about collecting the news in order to keep that trust, because the trust is our most valuable asset, and the minute we let go of that then… our business models will frankly fall apart.”
Vera Jourová, Vice-President for Values and Transparency at the European Commission commented that „We are focusing on improving the system where the people will get the facts right…We are not correcting anyone’s opinions or language. This is about the facts.”[18] This is being done, „to equip the people with the facts so that they can make the autonomous choice.” Jourová also outlines the importance of working with the [social media] platforms for fact-checking purposes and with advertisers for helping limit proliferation of false ideas. She recognizes the delicate balance that the EU commission is attempting to maintain, both seeking to „regulate information space” and upholding freedom of speech, a „primary principle in the EU. Therefore, when seeking to regulate content pertaining to disinformation, Jourová explains the importance of „evidenced-based truth” in reporting and demonetizing those platforms who are accused to spreading or allowing disinformation. “Disinformation makes money. We try to cut them off the money. Starve them out.”
Missing from this conversation, however, is a much larger, and much more foundational question: namely, who gets to decide what constitutes truth? Truth in journalism is far more nuanced than many politicians like to acknowledge. Not that questions as to what happened are necessarily subject to reality checks, so much as disagreements about what perspective is the „right” way to tell a story. And the primary cause of this discrepancy I argue is not a question of reality, but one of definition.
And of course, we must position this whole conversation in light of its relationship with free speech, with which our tendency to shut down disparate opinions has its own messy relationship. After all, say the staunch advocates of free speech, shouldn’t one be able to speak uncomfortable ideas, even if they are in fact false. Such crackdowns have potential to hamper such valuable political tools such as satire, parable, analogy, etc. Besides, as explained Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 1919 dissent in Abrams vs. The United States, „the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”[19] This idea of speech, whether uncomfortable, uncertain, or irritating, being necessary to the persistence of the free state has become a sort of absolute standard in US public policy.
This is how it started. But 2024’s society is very different from Holmes’ world of over 100 years ago. The emergence of widespread digital publishing and an ever-increasing mobile and connected world has tested the limits of what speech should be allowed. Disinformation is arguably more prevalent and, more importantly, more accessible than ever. Consequently, there have been more and more attempts to use the available tools to place limits on what the people are allowed to read, hear, and consider. And as justification for these suppression efforts, one will often find the term „disinformation” at the forefront.
Recent American media is littered with examples of news stories that were suppressed in the name of regulating disinformation when later, it was determined that what was suppressed was actually more actuate than initially thought. Just a few examples demonstrate the general nature of this process.
In October 2020, just a few weeks before the U.S. Presidential election, the famous Hunter Biden laptop story hit the New York Post. Almost immediately, the story was deemed „Russian” disinformation. According to the House Judiciary Committee, „Twitter blocked the story from being shared, while Facebook deamplified the story, significantly reducing its circulation and prevalence in users’ newsfeeds.”[20] Over 2 years later it was determined that in fact, the laptop was real, and the story was real, and should not have been censored.[21] But, it was too little, too late. Any effect the now-recognized-as-legitimate story would have had on the election had passed, and those who view this as yet another attempt at media manipulation were vindicated.
Another instance: The so-called lab leak theory about COVID 19. For a time, Facebook was actively prohibiting posts that suggested the pandemic originated in a Wuhan, China lab. As of February 8, 2021, among their „false claims” are „COVID-19 is man-made or manufactured”. From that point until the parameters were revised on May 26, 2021, such claims were considered „disinformation.” And, while official Chinese state media reports such as the Beijing Review continue to hold the line that any suggestion of COVID being a lab leak is „a Politically Poisoned Theory (Zhong Cheng)” and „racist (Mahoney)”, in recent years, American media outlets as diverse as the New York Times,[22] USA Today,[23] and FOXNews,[24] have all acknowledged how wrong they were about the labeling of the „lab leak theory” as „fake news” and thus worthy of removal. The libertarian organization, Reason.org argues „concession that the lab leak story it once viewed as demonstrably false is actually possibly true should put to rest the idea that banning or regulating misinformation should be a chief public policy goal.[25]” This time, the „disinformation” was COVID related. But next time, who is to say what will be „wrong?” History is rife with absolute statements of fact that later turn out to be laughable. If excessive smoking actually plays a role in the production of lung cancer, it seems to be a minor one,” quipped Dr. W. C. Heuper of the National Cancer Institute in 1954. „Heavier than air flying machines are impossible,” stated Lord Kelvin, British mathematician, physicist, and President of the British Royal Society.” (XXX Experts speak 256). What would have happened if disagreeing with each of these statements would have been deemed „disinformation” and thus unable to be argued, or challenged?
We see clearly the problem with „disinformation” as it is now to commonly applied. And we see also the need for greater adherence of free speech in a society whose limits should not be imposed by, unfortunately, even the experts.
This presents a true dilemma for the future of challenging „disinformation.” I believe it’s fair to say that a decision based on truth would be preferrable to one based in lies, but how do you navigate this precarious tightrope without erring too far on either side. There is a way through, and we are seeing it play out in real time. And it is having the result of both disrupting the tendency to dismissing everything as „disinformation” while simultaneously providing a sort of limit to free speech. And though the solution may seem simple, it is not that common.
As a reminder, Richard Weaver’s definition of „devil term” includes that “they defy any real analysis.” In short, a solution is to conduct the necessary analysis.
As an example, in October 2023, Canadian politician Pierre Poilievre was being interviewed by a journalist and is asked, „In terms of your… strategy currently, you’re obviously taking the populist pathway.” Note the subtle assertion embedded in this phrase. It’s an accusation cloaked as an obvious fact. One might even call „populist” a sat of devil term. But, instead of reacting, Poilievre simply interrupts and asks, „What does that mean?” The journalist replies, „Well, certainly you tap very strong ideological language quite frequently.” And Poilievre responds, „like what?” The journalist responds, „A lot of people would say you’re simply taking a page out of Donald Trump book.” And Pollievre asks, „Like which people?” The journalist says „I don’t know who, but I’m sure there’s some out there…” And the conversation continues.[26] This is a perfect example an instance where „disinformation” could have been weaponized, but instead, a rational conversation is forced into the open space of public debate. Poilievre refuses to go on the defensive, but instead, forces the journalist to explain terms, and back those ideas up with fact, not narrative.
Another example: in January 2023, presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy is asked by a reporter, „Do you condemn white privilege and white nationalism?” Ramaswamy replies, „Of course… Stop picking on this farce at some figment that exists at some infinitesimally small fringe of the American public today to open our eyes to the actual real threats that we face. And I think that it’s frankly questions and framings like that that is caused the American public to lose all trust in the mainstream media, I’m sorry to say for good reason.”
The reporter reposes her question: „You won’t say that you condemn white supremacy?” Ramaswamy rebuts, „I’m not going to recite some catechism for you. I’m against vicious racial discrimination in this country. I’m not pledging allegiance to your new religion of modern wokeism… Do I condemn vicious racial discrimination? Yes, I do. Am I going to play your silly game of gotcha? No, I am not.[27]”
Here again, the terms „white supremacy” and „white nationalism” could be seen as devil terms, obliging the accused to respond with a visceral repudiation. But here, Ramaswamy does not, instead calling out the definitions being used in the question, and laying bare the game being played by the reporter, hoping, ostensibly, to get him on record in support of a scandalous assertion. Ramaswamy, like Poilievre, pulls the conversation out of the realm of accusatory terminology, and into the space of definitions, accurate assertions, and reason.
And it is in this space that disinformation struggles to survive. If something is, in fact, fake news then open dialogue allows opportunity to demonstrate falsehood.
It is certainly true that the addition of social media presents a different dilemma, as true „disinformation” can travel far and wide with no counterpoint. But the solution, it seems, has potential to be worse than the problem. By calling everything „disinformation,” subject to the opinion of the gatekeeper, and removing whatever point of view happens to be intolerable at the moment, we risk letting true lies roam free, without challenge.
The disinformation dilemma is real. And it is unyielding. And it will only grow. And the solution, I argue, is to allow good information to confront the bad, with unrestricted fervor. Doing so could well restore trust in media organizations, in social media, and in the valuation of public debate. Also, as demonstrated by just a few of the examples above, willingness to enter into conversation, demanding definitions, and showing a propensity to engage on a level of honesty may be a way, perhaps not through, but forward.
* The author is professor of Communication at Grace College in Winona Lake, Indiana, USA.
[1] https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19987/19987.txt
[2] “RUSSIA’S KGB CONTINUES “ON AN ABSOLUTELY ENORMOUS SCALE””. U.S. News & World Report, February 24, 1975. advance-lexis-com.heinz.grace.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn: contentItem:3SJ4-DTD0-000C-D4HY-00000-00&context=1516831. Accessed January 18, 2024.
[3] (January 28, 1980, Monday, AM cycle). Gromyko Accused of Spreading Disinformation. The Associated Press. https://advance-lexis-com.heinz.grace.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJ4-J9P0-0011-41NG-00000-00&context=1516831.
[4] https://thf-legal.s3.amazonaws.com/Voter%20Fraud%20Database/47th%20batch/Part%20II/Michael%20Ray%20Overall%202022%20WI%20Source%202.pdf
[5] https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search
[6] https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2016/10/18/presidential-forecast-updates/newsletter.html
[8] https://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/watch/scientist-predicts-99-chance-of-clinton-win-801634371744
[9] https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/pope-francis-donald-trump-endorsement/
[10] https://www.factcheck.org/2016/10/did-the-pope-endorse-trump/
[11] https://www.ncronline.org/francis-tells-us-catholics-vote-their-conscience-november-election
[12] https://www.factcheck.org/2017/01/trump-pulls-quotes-aca-context/
[13] https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/816264484629184513
[14] https://nypost.com/2016/10/04/bill-clinton-slams-obamacare-as-craziest-thing-in-the-world/
[15] https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/michael-moore-supports-trump/
[16] https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/318534-people-cant-tell-the-difference-between-alternative-facts-and/
[17] https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2024/sessions/special-address-by-ursula-von-der-leyen-president-of-the-european-commission-96293a5a9d
[18] https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2024/sessions/defending-truth-battling-disinformation-for-information-integrity/
[19] https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/supreme-court-case-library/abrams-v-united-states
[20] https://judiciary.house.gov/media/press-releases/testimony-reveals-fbi-employees-who-warned-social-media-companies-about-hack
[21] https://nypost.com/2022/11/21/cbs-confirms-hunter-biden-laptop-is-real-769-days-after-post-broke-story/
[22] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/19/us/politics/covid-origins-lab-leak-politics.html
[23] https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2023/03/02/covid-lab-leak-china-not-conspiracy-theory/11364905002/
[24] https://www.foxnews.com/media/credibility-crisis-egg-medias-face-after-dismissing-covid-lab-leak-debunked-conspiracy-theory
[25] https://reason.com/2021/06/04/lab-leak-misinformation-media-fauci-covid-19/
[26] https://twitter.com/townhallcom/status/1714276316382683511
[27] https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2024/01/03/ramaswamy_vs_washington_post_reporter_im_not_going_to_recite_some_catechism_for_you_to_condemn_white_supremacy.html
